The research underneath
the program practice.

Outlook UAS grounds program review and scenario-based training in graduate research, operating experience, and published standards. This page states what the study found, what it did not test, and how the findings are used.

Aerial site rendered as a measured digital surface model with net-volume analytics

The evidence is not presented as a guarantee or an endorsement. It is a disciplined basis for deciding where practical training and program review should look.

Research and operating record

ResearchGraduate thesis applying the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System to U.S. Part 107 accident and incident data. The remote-pilot competency taxonomy produced by the work helps structure review and training.
EducationM.S., Uncrewed and Autonomous Systems, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.
TeachingFormer Instructor of Record for accredited undergraduate uncrewed aircraft systems coursework and university UAS program management.
OperationsSafety Management System authorship; airmen and aircraft records oversight under FAA Parts 91, 107, and 135; FAA Part 107; and Part 61 rotorcraft.
StandardsFAA Part 107 Airman Certification Standards, ASPRS Positional Accuracy Standards Edition 2, and HFACS.

Credentials and study documentation are available on request.

What did the study ask?

Part 107 remote-pilot certification relies on a written knowledge test and does not include a practical flight check. The thesis asked whether the abilities implicated in reported UAS accidents and incidents align with what that knowledge test assesses.

The study coded 166 U.S. accident and incident reports from NASA ASRS and NTSB, covering 2016 through 2025, to HFACS 8.0 Level 1.

The unsafe acts grouped into three patterns

Skill-based errorsApproximately 36% of coded unsafe acts. These included control, workload, attention, scan, and recovery when conditions changed.
Judgment and decision-making errorsApproximately 33% of coded unsafe acts. These involved the wrong call in the moment, including go or no-go decisions and responses to changing conditions.
Known deviationsApproximately 32% of coded unsafe acts. These involved knowingly departing from a rule the operator already understood.

The percentages are rounded, which is why the approximate values do not sum to exactly 100%.

The strongest signal sat outside the written test

Unsafe-act type was significantly associated with whether Part 107 assesses the related ability.

The errors cluster in what the test doesn’t measure.

Unsafe-act type was significantly associated with what Part 107 assesses (Cramér’s V = .44, a medium-to-large effect; p < .001). Skill-based errors concentrated in competencies the written test does not assess (69.5%); known deviations concentrated in the competencies it does (84.9%). A written exam can show a pilot recognizes the rules. It cannot show whether they can hold control, scan, manage workload, or recover when it goes sideways.

The study’s strongest signal: the errors most tied to accidents fall where the written test cannot look. Retrospective association study; not a measure of any program’s effectiveness.

That gap is what the practice is built around. A certificate proves knowledge. Flight competence, decision-making under load, and a culture that follows the rules it already knows are separate things, and they are what the accident record keeps surfacing. No matter the aircraft or sensor, the FAA and the data put the operator in command and responsible for the flight.

What the study does and does not establish

This was a retrospective association study of publicly reported events. It identifies where coded unsafe acts and certification coverage align. It does not establish causation, evaluate any training program’s effectiveness, promise an outcome, or rank operators by experience. Figures are from the thesis dataset, N = 166, HFACS 8.0 Level 1.

Public reporting systems also have selection and reporting limits. The practice uses the study to aim questions and scenarios, not to claim that the dataset represents every Part 107 operation or event.

How the findings are used

The remote-pilot competency taxonomy helps structure the Readiness Call and target scenario-based training. It keeps three program layers visible: what an operator knows, what the operator can demonstrate, and what the operating culture reinforces over time.

Program discovery

Locate whether training, governance, records, or another constraint comes first.

Readiness Call

Discuss the program as it runs and receive a verbal next-step recommendation.

Scenario-based training

Connect practical work and decision points to the patterns in the event record.

Operator toolkit

The templates and reference material that carry the taxonomy into daily operations.

Start with the operating question.

Use the free 30-minute call to discuss where the program stands and whether the research framework is relevant to the current need. The call provides a verbal recap and recommended next step, not a written finding or score.